ABSTRACT
Judicial accountability is indispensable to constitutional democracy because it reinforces public confidence while preserving judicial independence. The resignation of Justice Yashwant Varma during pending accountability proceedings has exposed an unresolved constitutional question: whether resignation should terminate disciplinary processes initiated against judges of the higher judiciary. Although the Constitution of India prescribes a detailed mechanism for the removal of judges under Articles 124 and 217, it remains silent on the legal consequences of resignation after the commencement of misconduct proceedings. This article examines the constitutional and statutory framework governing judicial accountability and evaluates whether the existing legal regime adequately addresses this institutional gap. The study adopts a doctrinal and comparative research methodology by analyzing constitutional provisions, judicial decisions, parliamentary materials, Law Commission reports, scholarly literature and recent institutional developments. It argues that resignation should conclude judicial tenure but should not automatically extinguish institutional accountability where allegations of serious misconduct have already been subjected to lawful inquiry. Drawing upon comparative constitutional practices, the article proposes legislative and institutional reforms to strengthen transparency, procedural certainty and public confidence. It concludes that a balanced accountability framework, consistent with judicial independence and the rule of law, is essential for enhancing the credibility and constitutional legitimacy of the Indian judiciary.
Keywords:Judicial Accountability; Judicial Resignation; Constitutional Governance and Rule of Law.
